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FACT SHEET #71: SHORTCHANGING THE UNPAID
ACADEMIC INTERN
Patricia L. Reid∗
Abstract
On the eve of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s seventy-fifth
anniversary, unpaid academic internships threaten to outpace
government regulation and undermine opportunities for gainful
employment. Although coveted by students eager to fill a line on their
résumé, unpaid academic internships are a subspecies of unpaid
internships that might soon face extinction. While the advent of unpaid
internship litigation decreases the likelihood that employers will plead
ignorance of the law when they defend against disgruntled unpaid
interns, recent litigation does little to clear up a half-century of
contradictory case law. The only certainty that surrounds the legal status
of unpaid academic internships is that Fact Sheet #71, the current
regulatory mechanism, shortchanges the unpaid academic intern. Fact
Sheet #71’s six-prong test neither affords meaningful protection nor
fosters beneficial learning opportunities.
Congress must exchange Fact Sheet #71’s old currency for a new
currency, a currency that invests in America’s future and fosters
meaningful internship opportunities for students. The key to effective
regulation is distinguishing between educationally beneficial and
educationally deficient unpaid internships. This distinction will
simultaneously safeguard students from unfair employment
relationships and allow students to prosper in educationally beneficial
opportunities. To successfully revise the current regulations, Congress
must first understand why the six-prong test fails to promote uniform
interpretation and application. Second, Congress must delegate its
regulatory power to the Department of Education, the most qualified
agency to measure the educational value of unpaid academic
internships. And third, Congress must codify a new test, one that
provides a predictable legal framework on which students and
employers can rely. Only then, when Congress exchanges its old
regulations for new, will Congress stop shortchanging students and
invest in their future.
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INTRODUCTION
In an era in which over one-third of college students complete an
internship before graduation,1 internships are “key in today’s
economy”2 and “the gateway into the white-collar work force.”3 Career
experts proclaim that “the academic experience alone is just not

1. Menachem Wecker, 10 National Universities That Produce the Most Interns, US
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/the-shortlist-college/articles/2012/11/20/10-national-universities-that-produce-the-most-interns (noting that,
among ranked colleges that report internship data, 36.9% of students had an internship). Some
colleges’ internship participation rates are much higher. For example, eighty-six percent of
Clarkson University graduates interned, a statistic that earned the school the right to claim that it
had “the largest percentage of interns among the class of 2011.” Id.
2. Beth Braccio Hering, Why Are Internships So Important?, MSN CAREERS (Mar. 1,
2010, 12:36 PM), http://msn.careerbuilder.com/Article/MSN-2202-College-Internships-FirstJobs-Why-Are-Internships-So-Important (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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enough.”4 These experts urge students to “get as many internships as
[they] possibly can” because “[g]etting a degree doesn’t mean [they
will] get a job.”5 Companies like Dream Careers, Inc. (f/k/a University
of Dreams) detect this mounting pressure and convince ambitious
students and gullible parents to pay as much as $10,000 for an unpaid
“guaranteed internship placement” with a desirable name like
DreamWorks, Dolce & Gabana, or Merrill Lynch.6 Whether bought or
earned, unpaid internships are everywhere,7 even in the White House.8
Of the 1.5 million internships in the United States, nearly half are
unpaid.9 What about internships is so desirable that around 750,000
people work for free each year?10 Perhaps the opportunity to acquire a
new profession’s skills entices students.11 Maybe they seek “real life
4. Kate Merrill, Employers Taking Advantage of Unpaid Interns, CBS BOS. (June 28,
2012, 11:59 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2012/06/28/survey-questions-benefits-of-unpaidinternships (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Alan Farnham, Job Prospects for New Grads Best Since Recession, ABC NEWS (May
15, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/jobs-outlook-college-graduates/story?id=16345862
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See generally DREAM CAREERS, http://www.summerinternships.com (last visited June
17, 2014). For a list of prospective employers, see Employer List, DREAM CAREERS,
http://www.summerinternships.com/employerList (last visited June 17, 2014). Regarding Dream
Careers’ tuition, see Kristen Sze, Students Pay Big Bucks for Internships, ABC 7 NEWS (Feb. 6,
2009), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/education&id=6644672 (“[F]ees range
from $5,000 to $10,000 . . . .”).
7. While still a staple of industries such as film and journalism, unpaid internships
now permeate nearly every field, including fashion, publishing, marketing, public relations,
art, law, and medicine. Tracie Powell, How to Tell When Unpaid Internships Are Opportunities,
When They’re Abuse, POYNTER (May 10, 2012, 10:51 AM), http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/careerdevelopment/173377/how-to-tell-when-unpaid-internships-are-opportunities-when-theyre-an-abuse
(last updated May 10, 2012, 2:58 PM).
8. Internship Timeline and FAQs, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/
internships/FAQs (last visited June 17, 2014). In early 2010, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform investigated the White House’s unpaid internship program. Letter from
Darrell Issa, Ranking Member, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Barack Obama,
President, U.S. (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
IssaLettertoPOTUS-Interns.pdf. Despite groups’ attempts to affect change, the White House
internships remain unpaid due to an exception to minimum wage laws for unpaid internships
with government agencies. Julia Fisher, Revealed: The Insiders Whose Kids Got White House
Internships, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/node/114844.
9. Paul Davidson, Fewer Unpaid Internships to Be Offered, USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2012,
7:59 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/story/2012-03-07/summer-intern
ships-paid-unpaid/53404886/1. There are no official records of the total number of unpaid
internships. See Natalie Bacon, Note, Unpaid Internships: The History, Policy, and Future
Implications of “Fact Sheet #71,” 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 67, 69 (2011).
10. Davidson, supra note 9.
11. KATHRYN ANNE EDWARDS & ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, DĒMOS, PAVING THE
WAY THROUGH PAID INTERNSHIPS: A PROPOSAL TO EXPAND EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOW-INCOME COLLEGE STUDENTS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/PavingWay_PaidInternships_Demos.pdf.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 9

1378

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

experience” outside the classroom.12 Or maybe students view
internships as a foot in the door to future employment.13 Either way, the
fact that 84% of college students plan to intern before they graduate14
illustrates the mass appeal of internships.
While many commentators praise the unpaid academic internship
system, others find fault with its very core. Some, for example,
condemn the system for its indirect exclusion of students of modest
means15 and its disproportionate exclusion of minorities.16 Others
lament the loss of tax revenues that support Social Security,
unemployment, and workers’ compensation premiums.17 Critics blame
wage depression on an oversupply of free interns.18 They often blame
universities and colleges for “farm[ing] out” free labor in exchange for
easy tuition dollars.19 But what most alarms critics is the tendency of
unpaid internships to depress interns’ expectations and to create
overidentification with employers.20 Scholars therefore worry that
unpaid internships ultimately damage the career prospects of young
interns.21
12. Why You Need an Internship, HISP. SCHOLARSHIP FUND (internal quotation marks
omitted), http://web.archive.org/web/20101215065716/http://hsf.net/cCenter-inner.aspx?id=
2564 (archived copy) (last visited June 17, 2014).
13. EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 11, at 3.
14. Anya Kamenetz, Take This Internship and Shove It, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/opinion/30kamenetz.html.
15. EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 11, at 3. In a recent exposé, the White
House’s internship program was yet again under fire, this time for its focus on the privileged
and for its failure to “represent a cross section of the nation.” Fisher, supra note 8; see also
Ginia Bellafante, Seeking Chic, Brilliant Intern to Thread Needles (No Pay), N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/nyregion/seeking-chic-edgy-brilliant-intern-tothread-needles-free.html (noting that unpaid internships “deprive[] an entire class of people
from whole categories of entry-level work”).
16. Ross Eisenbrey, Unpaid Internships Hurt Mobility, ECON. POL’Y INST. BLOG (Jan. 5,
2012, 3:42 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/unpaid-internships-economic-mobility.
17. Ross Eisenbrey, Unpaid Internships: A Scourge on the Labor Market, ECON. POL’Y
INST. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/unpaid-internships-scourge-labormarket.
18. See Kamenetz, supra note 14.
19. Eisenbrey, supra note 17; Lydia Emmanouilidou, Internship Courses Raise
Controversy, JUSTICE (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.thejustice.org/news/internship-courses-raisecontroversy-1.3133566#.UuhE12Qo4y4 (last updated Jan. 28, 2014). Colleges and universities
exploit unpaid interns in other manners, too. Some, for example, fill paid positions on their
campuses with unpaid interns. In particular, undergraduate athletic and business departments are
the subject of recent criticism and lawsuits. Casey McDermott, You Know Who Else Uses Unpaid
Interns? Colleges and Universities, PAC. STANDARD (Dec. 30, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.psmag.
com/navigation/business-economics/know-else-uses-unpaid-interns-colleges-universities-72118.
20. Kamenetz, supra note 14.
21. In 2013, a National Association of Colleges and Employers survey found that students
who accept unpaid internships are at a later disadvantage when they negotiate for their first
salary. The study found that students who work as unpaid interns make on average over $16,000
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As the number of internships rises, 22 the unemployment rate among
young workers sits at an unprecedented high.23 In 2010, for example,
the total number of unemployed workers included a disproportionate
percentage of young workers between the ages of sixteen and twentyfour.24 Though this age group comprised only 13% of the labor force,
they comprised 26% of the unemployed.25 Unemployment among
young workers reached 19.6% in 2010—the highest unemployment
level for the age group since 1947, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics
first recorded unemployment rates.26 A period of unemployment early
in life “can have lasting negative effects on future earnings,
productivity, and employment opportunities.”27 Some commentators
worry that, after the economy recovers, employers will permanently rely
on unpaid interns to cut costs.28 Commentators worry that unpaid
internships, like prolonged spells of unemployment, will damage the
future job prospects of today’s young workers.29
Similar risks caught Congress’s attention several decades ago when,
in 1938, Congress tasked the Department of Labor (DOL) Wage and
Hour Division (WHD) to ensure employer compliance with the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)30 and to protect the interests of young
less in their first year than students who worked as paid interns. Students with previous unpaid
internship experience make over $1,300 less than students with no prior internship experience.
Class of 2013: Paid Interns Outpace Unpaid Peers in Job Offers, Salaries, NAT’L ASS’N CS. &
EMPLOYERS (May 29, 2013), http://www.naceweb.org/s05292013/paid-unpaid-interns-joboffer.aspx.
22. Bacon, supra note 9, at 69.
23. Alexander Eichler, Employment Rate for Young Adults Lowest in 60 Years, Study
Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/
employment-rate-young-adults_n_126424.
24. U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMY: UNEMPLOYMENT
AMONG YOUNG WORKERS 1 (2010), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/
?a=Files.Serve&File_id=adaef80b-d1f3-479c-97e7-727f4c0d9ce6.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. E.g.,
Unpaid
Internships:
Not
Just
the
Economy,
SKILLEDUP,
http://www.skilledup.com/unpaid-internships-not-just-the-economy (last visited June 17, 2014).
Scholars who compare current unemployment rates with post-recession unemployment rates—
not all recorded rates—are less worried about the economy that young workers face. Farnham,
supra note 5. Others are less worried because they believe that unpaid internships will never
replace entry-level jobs because “[the] two roles aren’t cut from the same cloth,” “[t]he pay and
benefits aren’t equal,” “[i]nterns have no legal protection,” and “[i]nternships don’t guarantee
full-time employment.” Heather R. Huhman, 4 Reasons Internships Aren’t the New Entry-Level
Jobs, PARADE (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://parade.condenast.com/253997/heatherhuhman/4reasons-internships-arent-the-new-entry-level-jobs.
29. U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 24, at 1.
30. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (1940). Congress enacted the Fair Labor
Standards Act in 1938. The Act established a variety of standards for minimum wage, overtime
pay, business recordkeeping, and youth employment. See id. The Act collides with unpaid
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workers.31 After the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal unpaidworker case, Walling v. Portland Terminal, Co.,32 WHD developed the
Court’s analysis into a six-prong test to accomplish these goals.33 From
that point forward, WHD used the six-prong test to determine a
worker’s entitlement to a minimum wage.34
Subsequent courts continued to quarrel over the proper test to apply
to unpaid worker lawsuits. As a result, the six-prong test’s interpretation
and application in judicial settings was far from uniform. WHD’s
memorialization of a simplified form of the six-prong test in Fact Sheet
#71 did little to clarify the law, and now, after simmering for over sixty
years, the courts’ disagreements form the basis of a wave of unpaidinternship litigation.
This wave of challenges to the legality of unpaid internships requires
courts to reinterpret Portland Terminal, Fact Sheet #71, and other
precedent. If courts unquestioningly accept Fact Sheet #71 and its six
prongs, then their holdings could signal the “beginning of the end”35 for
unpaid academic internships as employers cut internship programs in
response to the increased legal risk.36
Even though college graduates and middle-age workers now join the
ranks of unpaid interns, this Note focuses only on unpaid academic
internships. As such, it proposes a sustainable legal solution crafted
specifically for students who seek academic credit as compensation for
their work with private employers. Part I of this Note provides essential
internships because interns covered under the Act are entitled to a minimum wage, currently
$7.25 per hour. Compliance Assistance – Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR [hereinafter Compliance Assistance], http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/index.htm
(last visited June 17, 2014). See infra Sections I.B–C for more discussion of the six factors
WHD uses to determine whether the FLSA applies to an intern and thus entitles the intern to
receive a minimum wage.
31. WHD created Fact Sheet #71 as a nonbinding source “for general information . . . not
to be considered in the same light as official statements of position contained in regulations.”
WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE
FAIR
LABOR
STANDARDS
ACT
(2010)
[hereinafter
FACT
SHEET
#71],
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf.
32. 330 U.S. 148 (1947). Portland Terminal held that railroad company trainees were not
employees, so the Fair Labor Standards Act did not prohibit the railroad company from training
them without paying them the applicable minimum wage. Id. at 153.
33. See 1 LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE AND HOUR LAW § 3:13 & n.6
(Westlaw updated Mar. 2014).
34. Id. § 3:13 (“Wage and Hour has taken the position that a person who meets all six of
the following criteria is a trainee: . . . .”).
35. Josh Sanburn, The Beginning of the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME (May 2,
2012), http://moneyland.time.com/2012/05/02/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-unpaid-internship-aswe-know-it.
36. Davidson, supra note 9; see Kit Johnson, The Wonderful World of Disney Visas, 63
FLA. L. REV. 915, 943 (2011) (noting that the Walt Disney Company does not sponsor unpaid
internships).
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background to the unpaid internship debate. It begins with an analysis
of the fundamental case that yielded the current employment status test,
and then discusses the test’s economic context and subsequent
application to unpaid internships. Part II details the state of today’s
economy by tracking current unpaid internship litigation. It also
explores three proposals to change current unpaid internship regulation
by addressing the unique challenges today’s economy presents.
Part III proposes a new form of unpaid academic internship
regulation: a modified version of DOL’s six-prong test and Congress’s
delegation of regulatory power over unpaid academic internships to the
Department of Education (ED). This solution empowers the agency that
is best equipped to evaluate the academic value of unpaid internships
and to balance minimum wage concerns. Finally, this Note concludes
with a discussion of how Congress’s delegation of regulatory power to
ED will affect unpaid internships and why such changes are desirable.
I. THE HISTORY OF INTERNSHIP REGULATION
Modern internship regulation began in 1938, when Congress enacted
FLSA.37 Congress tasked WHD to protect workers and to ensure
employer compliance with FLSA’s minimum wage standard.38 Even
though the minimum wage standard is perhaps the most important
aspect of internship regulation, it was not until 1947 that the Supreme
Court heard a case that involved unpaid workers and their potential
entitlement to minimum wage.39 The case, Walling v. Portland
Terminal, Co., motivated WHD’s later attempts to regulate unpaid
internships and sparked the confusion that surrounds unpaid internships
today.
A. Walling v. Portland Terminal, Co.: Where the Internship
Train First Derailed
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Walling v. Portland
Terminal, Co. forms the basis for WHD’s Fact Sheet #71.40 In Portland
Terminal, the Supreme Court contemplated whether a railroad company
violated FLSA when it refused to compensate prospective yard
brakemen with a minimum wage.41 As part of its employment process,
the railroad company required prospective yard brakemen to attend an
unpaid practical-training program.42 The railroad company never hired
workers who failed to complete the program—program completion was
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (1940).
Id.; Compliance Assistance, supra note 30.
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
Compare id. at 149–50, 152–53, with FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31.
Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 150.
Id. at 149, 150.
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essential to earn the railroad company’s trust.43
Upon completion of the training program, the railroad company
offered some of the prospective yard brakemen jobs.44 The railroad
company placed some of the others into a pool of available qualified
yard brakemen who could work on an as-needed basis.45 Only the
brakemen whom the railroad company hired would receive a retroactive
allowance of $4 per day of training.46
The main issues in Portland Terminal were whether all of the
prospective yard brakemen “trainees” qualified as “employees” under
FLSA and whether all of the prospective yard brakemen deserved
minimum wage compensation for their participation in the training
program.47 To resolve the question, the Court examined several factors
that are now collectively known as the Portland Terminal test.48
First, the Supreme Court found that the prospective brakemen did
not displace regular workers.49 Instead, they required constant
supervision by regular employees who “d[id] most of the work
themselves.”50 Second, FLSA did not govern the relationship because
the railroad company did not promise the brakemen a job or
remuneration for their participation in the program.51 Third, the railroad
company provided the brakemen with practical training that was similar
to the instruction the workers would receive from a vocational school.52
The Supreme Court decided not to penalize the railroad company when
it provided the same education free of charge.53 Fourth, the training
primarily benefited the brakemen.54 Similar to students who attend
school to receive an education, the brakemen learned the skills of a new
trade in the training program.55 And fifth, the brakemen’s presence
afforded the railroad company no immediate advantage.56 Instead, the
brakemen’s presence impeded the railroad company’s operation.57
43. Id. at 149.
44. Id. at 150.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 149–50.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 150.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 149.
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id.
55. Justice Black wrote for the Court and argued that FLSA permitted persons to “work
for their own advantage on the premises of another.” Id. at 152. “Otherwise,” he argued, “all
students would be employees of the school or college they attended, and as such entitled to
receive minimum wages.” Id.
56. Id. at 153.
57. Id. at 150.
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After the Supreme Court considered each of the factors, it concluded
that the prospective yard brakemen were trainees and not employees
entitled to receive a minimum wage.58 With these factors, the Supreme
Court christened the law’s first voyage into internship regulation.
B. Precedent Meets the Modern Internship
Portland Terminal prompted decades of disparate applications of the
test. Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Portland Terminal, WHD
developed six factors to determine whether FLSA requires an employer
to pay a minimum wage.59 It was not until 2010, however, that WHD
developed Fact Sheet #71 and applied these factors to unpaid internship
scenarios.60 Now, according to WHD’s test, for-profit companies may
use intern labor without paying a minimum wage if the internship meets
six criteria:
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation
of the facilities of the employer, is similar to training
which would be given in an educational environment;
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but
works under close supervision of existing staff;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern;
and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the
conclusion of the internship; and
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is
not entitled to wages for the time spent in the
internship.61
Even with the help of this iteration of the test, courts do not
uniformly apply FLSA to unpaid internship cases. For example, a
district court in the Second Circuit, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeal each apply a different test, not all of which
incorporate WHD’s six factors.62 Thus, employer “compliance with the
law is [still] nearly impossible.”63
58. Id. at 153.
59. See 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 33, § 3:13 & n.6.
60. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31.
61. Id.
62. Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 531–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989); Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am.,
545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008); Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th
Cir. 1993).
63. Jessica L. Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1546 (2010).
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A district court from the Second Circuit adopts the most inclusive
approach to unpaid internship cases. It considers the individual elements
of WHD’s six-factor test as part of a more in-depth analysis.64 In Archie
v. Grand Central Partnership, Inc., for example, the court held that a
company violated FLSA’s minimum wage requirements when it “failed
to [first] show that under the six-factor test, the [homeless participants
in its PTE Training Program] were trainees rather than employees.”65
The court recognized that though WHD’s test is “not determinative of
whether a person is an employee under the FLSA, it is a factor to be
weighed in the analysis.”66
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, rejects the six-prong test and
applies its own “principal benefit” test.67 Although the Fourth Circuit
and the Second Circuit make many of the same factual inquiries to
determine whether a worker deserves a minimum wage, the circuits
ultimately split over their interpretation of Portland Terminal. In
Isaacson v. Penn Community Services, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
Portland Terminal to hold that when the employer “received no
‘immediate advantage’ from the trainees’ services,”—essentially, when
“the principal purpose of the seemingly employment relationship was to
benefit the person in the employee status”—FLSA does not protect the
worker.68
The Fifth Circuit uses a less popular “economic realities” test to
focus on workers’ economic dependence on their employers.69 Though
the economic realities test involves a few of the same inquiries—such as
the degree of supervision a worker receives—the economic realities test
is otherwise distinct.70 It encompasses five factors that range from “the
extent of the relative investments of the worker and the alleged
employer” to “the skill and initiative required in performing the job.”71
Courts infrequently apply the economic realities test to unpaid
internship cases, however, and more commonly apply it to cases that
distinguish between employees and volunteers.72 As such, this test
exerts limited influence over unpaid academic internship cases.
And finally, the Tenth Circuit uses WHD’s six-prong test as part of a
totality of the circumstances analysis.73 It rejects an “all or nothing”
approach to WHD’s test, and instead applies the test as a “relevant but
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Archie, 997 F. Supp. at 531–35.
Id. at 533, 535.
Id. at 533.
McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1209 & n.2, 1210.
Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971).
See Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
E.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293 (1985).
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993).
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not conclusive . . . determination of whether . . . trainees [are]
employees under the FLSA.”74 As such, even when a defendant fails to
satisfy one prong of WHD’s test, like in Reich v. Parker Fire Prot.
Dist., the Tenth Circuit can still find that prospective workers or interns
are trainees and not employees.75 In the Tenth Circuit, a “single factor
cannot carry the entire weight of an inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances.”76
Not all circuits readily adopt aspects of Fact Sheet #71’s six-prong
test, however. In Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School Inc., the
Sixth Circuit described WHD’s test as a “poor method for determining
employee status in a training or educational setting” and ultimately
rejected the six-prong analysis for three reasons.77 First, the Solis court
found the test “overly rigid and inconsistent with a totality-of-thecircumstances approach, where no one factor (or the absence of one
factor) controls.”78 Second, the Solis court identified precedent that
“found the test’s all-or-nothing approach inconsistent with prior WHD
interpretations and opinions endorsing a flexible approach, thereby
diminishing any persuasive force the test might be entitled to.”79 And
third, the Solis court found WHD’s test to conflict with Portland
Terminal.80
Though it noted that the Supreme Court considered “various other
facets of the relationship” between the trainees and the railroad
company, the Sixth Circuit believed the Portland Terminal decision
rested more upon “whether the trainees received the primary benefit of
the work they performed.”81 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit developed
the primary benefit test as a substitute for WHD’s six-prong test.82
Because Solis found that the high school students received the primary
benefit from their work in the school’s sanitarium, the students were not
entitled to receive a minimum wage.83
Although Solis involves high school students,84 the Sixth Circuit’s
74. Id. at 1026–27.
75. Id. at 1029.
76. Id.
77. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch. Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 526.
82. Id. at 521, 526–29.
83. Id. at 519, 532. The Sixth Circuit did not reach this conclusion by adopting the
defendant high school’s argument that Portland Terminal stood for the proposition that
vocational students are automatically classified as non-employees. Instead, the Sixth Circuit
squarely rejected this argument because its basis was in the dicta of Portland Terminal, not the
holding. Id. at 523–24.
84. Id. at 520.
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reasoning would likely yield the same result in an unpaid academic
internship case that involves undergraduate students. In both scenarios,
the courts would consider the same factors, which would include: the
amount of on-site supervision the student receives, whether competition
for labor exists, whether the student’s academic credits transfer to other
institutions, and whether the employer promises a future job.85 Given
the similarities between the facts in Solis and the facts many unpaid
academic internships present, Solis is poised to become a persuasive
case in the consolidation and reinvention of unpaid academic internship
regulation.
C. The Advent of Unpaid Internship Litigation
While Solis may persuade courts to adopt the primary benefit test in
future unpaid academic internship cases, recent litigation could prove
equally influential. Though these cases do not directly concern unpaid
academic internships, if courts strictly adhere to Fact Sheet #71, then
they could inadvertently extinguish unpaid academic internships: to
eliminate the risk of adverse litigation, employers who cannot afford to
pay minimum wage will likely discontinue their internship programs,
even if their internships are academically beneficial.86
The menace of minimum wage litigation frightens potential
employers—the money they save by not paying interns does not seem
worth the legal risk.87 As a result, some interns will realize the benefits
of current class action litigation if courts strictly adhere to Fact Sheet
#71. Because some employers, like Fox Searchlight Productions,
already converted previously unpaid internships into paid positions,
students can learn new skills and receive a paycheck, too.88
85. Id. at 530–31; see also id. at 521 (noting that the majority of practical training courses
were approved by the state for transfer credit).
86. In October 2013, in the midst of unpaid internship litigation, Condé Nast announced
that it intended to end its internship program. Blair Hickman & Casey McDermott, 2013: The
Year of the Intern?, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER (Jan. 12, 2014), http://newpittsburghcourieronline.
com/2014/01/12/2013-the-year-of-the-intern. Internship outsourcing is another potential consequence
of unpaid internship litigation. If courts declare unpaid internships illegal, some companies vow to
respond by “hir[ing] more interns overseas” because their “interns can work remotely from
anywhere.” Melissa Schorr, The Revolt of the Unpaid Intern, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 12, 2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2014/01/12/unpaid-internships-are-they-doomed/vi8
MVMlqfeJQHlMY3vlBpJ/story.html.
87. Davidson, supra note 9.
88. In 2010, Fox Searchlight Productions announced plans to amend its internship
program to pay all interns $10 per hour. Joe Satran, ‘Black Swan’ Intern Lawsuit Proceeds,
Striking Blow Against Unpaid Labor in Film, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2012, 4:39 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/24/black-swan-intern-lawsuit_n_1828206.html
(last
updated Aug. 30, 2012, 9:02 PM). The move was undoubtedly intended to stave off future
litigation, such as the minimum wage litigation brought by unpaid interns who worked on the
Black Swan set. Id. Trial in that case was originally set for spring 2013, id., though by June
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Oftentimes, corporations settle lawsuits outside of court to avoid the
specter of unlimited liability.89 The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS),
for example, recently agreed to settle a minimum wage violation class
action lawsuit.90 A former unpaid intern initiated the lawsuit when she
claimed that her internship with the Charlie Rose Show violated New
York labor laws.91 In order to avoid litigation (and potentially
unfavorable precedent), PBS agreed to pay the lead plaintiff and 189
similarly situated former interns up to $250,000 in back wages and
$50,000 in legal fees.92 To the lead plaintiff and to many others who
watched the case unfold, the settlement marked “a really important
moment for this movement against unpaid internships.”93
Not every company, though, is as swift to shift its employment
policies or settle class action lawsuits. Other companies prefer to defend
against lawsuits and hope for favorable outcomes. Hearst Corporation,
the owner of the magazine Harper’s Bazaar, is one such company.
Despite the onslaught of a recent unpaid intern class action, Hearst
Corporation set out to “vigorously defend this matter.”94 Throughout the
litigation, the corporation steadfastly attested to the quality of its unpaid
internship program: “The internship programs at each of our magazines
are designed to enhance the educational experience of students who are
2013, the judge ruled that the interns were entitled to minimum wage. Steven Greenhouse,
Judge Rules that Movie Studio Should Have Been Paying Interns, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/judge-rules-for-interns-who-sued-fox-searchlig
ht.html. Perhaps what motivates such policy changes is the fact that “[m]inimum wage isn’t big
dollars compared to the cost of a lawsuit.” Schorr, supra note 86 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
89. Steven Greenhouse, ‘Charlie Rose’ Show Agrees to Pay Up to $250,000 to Settle Interns’
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/
charlie-rose-show-agrees-to-pay-up-to-250000-to-settle-interns-lawsuit. In the largest unpaid
internship class action settlement to date, Elite Model Management agreed to pay $450,000 to
approximately 150 of the company’s former unpaid interns. In light of the $50 million that the lead
plaintiff, Daija Davenport, originally sought in unpaid wages, overtime pay, and attorneys’ fees under
FLSA, however, $450,000 is a small price for the corporation to pay. Ashley Mosley, Why Unpaid
Internships Are No Catwalk for the Fashion Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2014, 11:02 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ashley-mosley/why-unpaid-internships-ar_b_4675855.html; Dhani
Mau, Elite Models to Fork Over $450,000 to Unpaid Interns in Class Action Settlement,
FASHIONISTA (Jan. 13, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://fashionista.com/2014/01/elite-models-to-fork-over-450000-tounpaid-interns-in-class-action-settlement; Jenna Zhang, Elite Model Management Settles with Former
Unpaid Interns, CHRONICLE (Durham, NC) (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/
2014/01/22/elite-model-management-settles-former-unpaid-interns.
90. Greenhouse, supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Christopher Zara, Hearst Corp. Seeks Allies in Lawsuit Against Unpaid Interns:
Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/hearst-corp-seeksallies-lawsuit-against-unpaid-interns-report-922413.
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receiving academic credit for their participation, and are otherwise fully
in compliance with applicable laws.”95 Hearst Corporation’s bold move
paid off. The corporation escaped a debilitating settlement and steep
attorney’s fees96 when the judge refused to grant class action status to
Wang and the other interns.97 Now, a few summers worth of wages is
the most Hearst Corporation stands to lose when it faces Wang and six
other interns alone.98
Other corporations’ litigation prospects are more expensive. When a
federal district court judge applied Fact Sheet #71’s test to the Black
Swan unpaid intern class action lawsuit,99 he determined that Fox
Searchlight Production’s interns were employees.100 Accordingly, the
production company violated minimum wage laws when it refused to
pay the plaintiff interns.101
The judge’s rejection of the primary benefit test in favor of Fact
Sheet #71’s six prongs darkened the prospects of corporations
embroiled in unpaid intern litigation.102 Though the Black Swan case
presents but one of many conflicting court opinions, it suggests that
courts no longer tolerate unpaid internships and instead require strict
compliance with Fact Sheet #71’s six prongs.
Given the existent discrepancies amongst the circuits, even when
courts resolve pending unpaid internship class actions, it is unlikely that
a clear answer will emerge as to which internships require a minimum
wage. Because the pending and recently decided cases do not involve
unpaid academic internships, a ruling in favor of the plaintiff interns
would not automatically ban all unpaid academic internships.
Nevertheless, such a ruling would serve as persuasive fodder for future
arguments and, in the meantime, would convince many employers to
95. Id. While Hearst Corporation’s justification seems convincing, the facts that lead
plaintiff Xeudan “Diana” Wang was twenty-seven years old and was not pursuing academic
credit for her fifty-five hour workweeks suggest that even if this policy existed, Hearst
Corporation did not follow it. See id. But see infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text
(offering reasons why, contrary to Hearst Corporation’s argument, an intern’s receipt of
academic credit does not exempt an employer from FLSA’s minimum wage requirements).
96. See Rebecca Greenfield, Class Action or Not, the Unpaid Intern Lawsuit at Hearst
Will Go On, WIRE (May 9, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/05/classaction-or-not-unpaid-intern-lawsuit-will-go/65059.
97. Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
98. Greenfield, supra note 96.
99. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
100. Id. at 534.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 532 (noting that under the test “the very same internship position might be
compensable as to one intern . . . and not compensable as to another”). Corporations’ prospects
darken because, arguably under Fact Sheet #71’s six prongs, “[t]he more useless the intern, the
better (legally speaking),” and most corporations cannot demonstrate a sufficient degree of
uselessness. Schorr, supra note 86.
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cancel their internship programs. If the plaintiff interns lose their class
action lawsuits or if they continue to settle, then the uncertain legal
status of unpaid academic internships will likely persist.
II. THE MODERN UNPAID INTERNSHIP: IS IT LEGAL?
Despite major shifts in the economic and employment landscapes
after 1947, several outdated aspects of Portland Terminal persist in
current unpaid internship regulation.103 Fact Sheet #71’s effort to apply
a modernized version of the Portland Terminal test is little more than
superficial—while the original factors remain almost wholly intact, the
most significant update is the substitution of “intern” and “internship”
for the Portland Terminal terms “trainee” and “training.”104
Yesterday’s stagnant standard is not an effective solution to
internship regulation today. The Supreme Court decided Portland
Terminal in a different era. Nearly a decade past the worst of the Great
Depression, in 1947, the year Portland Terminal was decided, the
unemployment rate rested at a healthy 3.9%.105 Students of this era
received less formal education than their modern counterparts. In the
years that immediately preceded Portland Terminal, only 6% of men
and 4% of women completed four years of college.106 Moreover, among
adults twenty-five years of age and older, the median number of years
of education hovered around 8.6.107
Americans today face a markedly different employment
environment. The unemployment rate is at 6.7% as of March 2014108
after having been above 8% for forty-three months,109 a period that
economists likened to a Great Recession.110 Education attainment rates
103. See supra Section I.B for the Sixth Circuit’s criticism of WHD’s outdated six-prong
test.
104. Compare FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31, with Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330
U.S. 148, 149–50 (1947).
105. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS.
[hereinafter Labor Force Statistics], http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat01.htm.
106. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: A
STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 7 (Thomas D. Snyder ed., 1993).
107. Id.
108. News Release, Bureau of Labor Stats., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment
Situation—March 2014 (Apr. 4, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_04042014.pdf.
109. Table of Monthly Unemployment Statistics from the Current Population Survey,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited June 17,
2014).
110. See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, Rethinking the Great Recession, WILSON Q., Winter
2011, at 16, 17. While the recession, as economists define it, ended in June 2009, US Business
Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/
cycles/cyclesmain.html (last visited June 17, 2014), popular sentiment is that the recession
continued much longer (or is still continuing), John W. Schoen, Many Feel Like Recession Still
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are also high. In 2010, 89% of 25- to 29-year-olds received at least a
high school diploma or equivalent certificate,111 and 32% of 25- to 29year-olds held at least a bachelor’s degree.112
Thus, WHD governs a different employment market than existed in
the years after Portland Terminal—the current market features a
fundamentally different type of worker with an overall higher level of
formal education. And although legislators should not abandon Portland
Terminal in its entirety, if they are to accommodate the current labor
landscape, then legislators must adapt the test beyond the substitution of
“intern” for “trainee.”113 Rather than focus solely on the protection of
blue-collar workers, labor regulations must strike a balance between
protection and opportunity for modern, educated workers.
Scholarly solutions to strike this balance abound. Some of the most
recent proposed reforms include eliminating unpaid internships in
certain industries,114 exempting certain industries from minimum wage
requirements,115 and creating a new “intern-learner” exemption that
permits interns to work for subminimum wages.116 And although some
of these solutions do not contemplate unpaid academic internships, their
theoretical bases can nevertheless guide legislators tasked with unpaid
academic internship regulation reform.
A. An Endangered Species of Internship
Professors Kristi L. Schoepfer and Mark Dodds suggest perhaps the
most drastic form of regulation: the elimination of unpaid academic
internships.117 While their symposium article limits its scope to unpaid
internships in the sport management industry, the authors’ main concern
applies to employers in all fields: does an unpaid intern’s value
outweigh associated legal risks?118 Schoepfer and Dodds do not believe
so.119

Hasn’t Ended, USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/personalfinance/2014/01/01/cnbc-recovery-slowed-economy/4222929.
111. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2011-033, THE CONDITION
OF EDUCATION 2011, at 74 (2011).
112. Id.
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
114. Kristi L. Schoepfer & Mark Dodds, Internships in Sport Management Curriculum:
Should Legal Implications of Experiential Learning Result in the Elimination of the Sport
Management Internship?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 183, 196–97 (2010).
115. Jennifer J. Kalyuzhny, Comment, Cultivating the Next Generation: Why Farming
Internships Should Be Legal, 21 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2012).
116. Curiale, supra note 63, at 1531.
117. Schoepfer & Dodds, supra note 114, at 184.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 197.
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Because sport organizations often solicit interns and benefit from
their presence, unpaid academic internships expose sport organizations
to labor law liability.120 Unpaid sport management internships are risky
because little legal precedent addresses the specific subgenre of unpaid
academic internships.
WHD warns employers that despite the lack of harmonious legal
precedent, “internships in the for-profit private sector will most often be
viewed as employment, unless the [six-part] test . . . is met.”121 Stated
more bluntly, Nancy J. Leppink, then-acting director of WHD, said,
“[i]f you’re a for-profit employer or you want to pursue an internship
with a for-profit employer, there aren’t going to be many circumstances
where you can have an internship and not be paid and still be in
compliance with the law.”122
Leppink’s cautionary advice shatters an assumption many sport
organizations make—if an unpaid intern receives academic credit for
the internship, then the intern will qualify as the primary beneficiary of
the internship, and the employer is not obligated to pay the intern
minimum wage.123 Nor does the receipt of academic credit legitimize
menial tasks like paper-pushing or coffee brewing. DOL’s statement
deconstructs this misguided notion: “the only acceptable activities for
unpaid interns are those that are purely for teaching purposes and do not
help with [a host organization’s] day-to-day tasks.”124
For this reason, with the advent of less risky alternatives, Schoepfer
and Dodds advise sport management programs to eliminate their unpaid
academic internship opportunities.125 Academic accreditation boards
previously required universities to provide internship opportunities for
sport management students.126 Recently revised standards, however,
demonstrate a trend more in line with Schoepfer and Dodds’s advice. In
lieu of the prior internship requirement, accreditation boards now permit
schools to substitute a capstone experience or a comprehensive exam.127
Although Schoepfer and Dodds’s recommendation to evaluate
unpaid academic internships on an industry-by-industry basis eliminates
legal risks, it more closely resembles scorched-earth policy than
compromise. Beneficial unpaid academic internships in the sport
120. Id. “Any employer that violates FLSA minimum wage standards may be liable for
unpaid wages, compensatory damages, and additional liquidated damages.” Id. at 198.
121. Id. at 194 (alterations in original) (quoting FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. at 198 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 195–96.
124. Id. at 196 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, “[t]he
more useless the intern, the better (legally speaking).” Schorr, supra note 86.
125. Schoepfer & Dodds, supra note 114, at 184, 201.
126. Id. at 189.
127. Id.
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management industry exist, but these opportunities will vanish if
employers heed Schoepfer and Dodds’s advice.128 Certainly, an
alternative to complete elimination could balance protection with
opportunity and could separate educationally beneficial unpaid
internships from educationally deficient unpaid internships.
B. An Advocate for Agricultural Exemption
Jennifer Kalyuzhny’s Comment presents the foil to Schoepfer and
Dodds’s argument. Kalyuzhny’s view supports an industry-by-industry
exemption of unpaid academic internships from the minimum wage
requirement, rather than an elimination of all unpaid academic
internships within select industries.129 More specifically, her proposal
exempts from minimum wage requirements all unpaid agricultural
internships.130
The premise behind Kalyuzhny’s proposal is that the main problems
FLSA regulates do not plague unpaid internships in industries such as
agriculture. For example, Kalyuzhny asserts that unpaid agricultural
interns lack the skills and qualifications necessary to replace paid
workers, whereas unpaid interns in other industries displace paid
workers and drive wages down.131 Because of this difference, unpaid
agricultural interns are less of a threat to paid workers than the typical
unpaid intern.
Kalyuzhny also argues that agricultural internships do not typically
lead to a permanent job with the same employer.132 Most often,
agricultural internships are short-term opportunities to learn valuable
skills that interns can later apply to their own farms.133 Unpaid
agricultural interns are thus less likely than the typical unpaid intern to
overly depend on their employer.134 Given these distinctions,
Kalyuzhny reasons that unpaid agricultural internships are distinctive
enough to warrant their exemption from minimum wage laws.135

128. See sources cited supra note 86 (noting that one firm terminated its internship
program and other firms considered outsourcing their internships due to the litigious
environment).
129. See Kalyuzhny, supra note 115, at 133, 147–49.
130. Id. at 151.
131. Id. at 152.
132. Id. at 152–53 (noting that these interns usually go on to run their own farms).
133. Id. at 152.
134. Id. at 153.
135. Id. at 152–53. Kalyuzhny’s proposed industry-wide exemption surpasses all previous
state-level initiatives to soften regulation of the agricultural industry. California, for example,
developed a program that incorporates 1800 hours of fieldwork and 11 academic courses in
order to introduce students interested in agricultural careers to classroom and on-site learning.
Washington developed a program that allows farms with annual sales of less than $250,000 to
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Despite the validity of many aspects of her theory, Kalyuzhny’s
industry-by-industry exemption falls prey to many of the same
weaknesses that plague Schoepfer and Dodds’s proposal. These
common weaknesses stem from the authors’ compartmentalized
approaches. An industry-by-industry analysis assumes that all unpaid
internships within the same industry are similar enough that WHD can
make a single determination as to whether a given industry’s academic
internships are legal. WHD can make such a determination only when it
categorizes industries in accordance with a much narrower scope than
“sport management” or “agriculture.” For example, even though WHD
could classify both an internship on a farm and an internship in the John
Deere corporate office as “agricultural” internships, the two internships
present a very different set of educational and legal concerns.
Only narrow classifications can account for the meaningful
differences between various sub-industries.136 But as the scope narrows,
other problems arise. One of the largest problems is that members of
nearly every industry can make the same type of arguments Kalyuzhny
makes for the agriculture industry.137 As each sub-industry lobbies for a
minimum wage exemption, the increasing number of exemptions
reduces the effectiveness of any WHD rule.
A better approach focuses not on distinctions between industries but
on characteristics within every industry that distinguish educationally
beneficial unpaid internships from educationally deficient unpaid
internships. Every industry offers both types of internships, but
Schoepfer’s, Dodds’s, and Kalyuzhny’s approaches treat all internships
within the same industry identically. Because the authors focus on
differences between industries, their proposed regulations do not focus
on the core purpose of academic internship regulation: the educational
benefit that the intern derives.
C. The “Intern-Learner” as the New “Learner” Exemption
Jessica L. Curiale’s Note steers away from the industry-by-industry
approach her scholarly predecessors adopt, and instead carefully
considers the mechanics of internship reform.138 Curiale proposes that
WHD promulgate an “intern-learner” exemption that is similar to the
current “learner” exemption.139
retain up to three unpaid interns per year. For a description and Kalyuzhny’s criticism of the
California and Washington programs, see id. at 147–49.
136. Even narrow exceptions, however, cannot account for new, developing industries that
do not fit neatly within the definition of any current industry.
137. At the very least, every industry can argue that it produces enough academically
beneficial internships to preempt WHD from classifying any of the industry’s unpaid internships
as illegal.
138. See generally Curiale, supra note 63.
139. Id. at 1553–54.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 9

1394

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Under this new exemption, if qualified employers create DOLapproved “intern-training” programs, then they can pay interns a
subminimum wage.140 Ideally, Curiale’s exemption and its associated
program would ensure that interns who deserve compensation receive
wages for their work and that the number of illegal unpaid internships
dwindles.141 Nevertheless, Curiale’s proposal is problematic for two
reasons.
First, employers must exert significant effort to establish an interntraining program and, in exchange, gain only the right to pay their
interns 15% less than the normal minimum wage.142 The employer must
not only submit a detailed proposal but also stay within strictly defined
intern-training program parameters.143 For instance, if either an
employer’s number of interns fluctuates or the length of the interntraining program varies, then the employer must start over and reapply
for a new exemption.144 Even if an employer’s intern-training program
does not change, the employer’s exemption is valid for only two
years.145
Potential employers who are already unwilling or unable to pay their
interns a minimum wage are unlikely to undergo the hassle of the
intern-training program approval process, especially for a paltry 15%
minimum wage reduction. Many illegal internships evade DOL
detection,146 and Curiale’s bureaucracy does little to incentivize
employer participation in the intern-training program that she proposes.
Even today, small companies often escape minimum wage scrutiny
because interns have little incentive to individually litigate a minimum
wage claim.147 As long as they can evade DOL detection, smaller
businesses would still have a strong incentive to ignore Curiale’s
program and thereby avoid the requirement to pay their interns the
remaining 85% of the minimum wage.
The second complication with Curiale’s proposed intern-learner
exemption is that it offers no new mechanism for enforcement. Its
requirements are easy to evade or falsify, and the WHD Administrator
depends on the employer to implement the intern-training program that
140. Id. at 1554.
141. Id. at 1531, 1559–60.
142. Id. at 1554.
143. Id. at 1554–55.
144. Id. at 1554.
145. Id.
146. See Angie Mohr, The Ethics and Economics of Unpaid Internships, INVESTOPEDIA,
(May 28, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0512/the-ethics-and-economicsof-unpaid-internships.aspx (“[T]he Labor Department will only investigate based on complaints.
Interns are unlikely to report their employers’ labor violations for fear of damaging their
relationship and future opportunities.”).
147. See supra Section I.C for a discussion of current unpaid internship litigation.
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the employer describes in the initial application. WHD may deny an
application for a certificate,148 but once WHD exempts an employer,
WHD has little ability to ensure the employer complies with the interntraining program.
As interns are already unlikely to report discrepancies,149 it is
ineffective to rely on interns to report noncompliance. Curiale’s
proposal fails to give interns new motivation to report abuses. Given
that educationally deficient internships can easily evade DOL detection,
and given that Curiale’s highly bureaucratic requirements deter
educationally beneficial internships, a different regulatory mechanism
must protect students and ensure employer compliance.
III. MODIFY, CODIFY, AND DELEGATE: THREE STEPS TOWARD
INTERNSHIP REFORM
Unpaid academic internship regulations are ineffective when they
operate either through a cumbersome exception or by industry-byindustry distinction. These approaches make artificial determinations
that fail to distinguish between educationally beneficial and
educationally deficient internships. These approaches distinguish unpaid
internships only in relation to one another—they cannot make the
necessary individualized determinations of educational value that
effective regulation requires.
A. The Department of Education’s Role in Internship Regulation
The first step toward effective internship reform is delegation. An
effective regulatory solution must distinguish educationally beneficial
internships from educationally deficient internships, and Congress must
delegate to the proper agency the authority to make these
determinations.
DOL, the current regulatory agency, is not the proper agency for the
job because DOL prioritizes economic considerations above educational
value. DOL’s mission is to “foster, promote, and develop the welfare of
the wage earners, job seekers, and retirees of the United States; improve
working conditions; advance opportunities for profitable employment;
and assure work-related benefits and rights.”150 Education-related
concerns are neither specifically mentioned within the mission
statement nor readily observable in DOL’s current regulatory efforts.
DOL’s framework demonstrates that the agency is not equipped to
148. See Curiale, supra note 63, at 1554.
149. See Mohr, supra note 146 (“Interns are unlikely to report their employers’ labor
violations for fear of damaging their relationship and future opportunities.”).
150. Our Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/mission.htm
(last visited June 17, 2014).
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maximize educational value and legalize educationally beneficial
opportunities.
Instead, the ED is better situated to achieve these fundamental goals.
Unlike DOL’s mission, ED’s mission aligns with the concerns of unpaid
academic internships: “to promote student achievement and preparation
for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and
ensuring equal access.”151 ED is also the appropriate regulatory agency
because ED is already tasked with “[i]dentify[ing] major issues in
education and focus[ing] national attention on them.”152 Because ED
already seeks to maximize educational value and to create meaningful
learning opportunities, ED can quickly transition into a key internshipregulating role. Congress’s first step toward internship reform should
therefore be to enact a law that delegates to ED—not DOL—the power
to regulate unpaid academic internships.
B. Proposed Revisions
The next steps in Congress’s unpaid academic internship reformation
should be (1) to modify WHD’s six-prong test and (2) to codify a new
version of the test, a version that will serve as a starting point for ED’s
unpaid academic internship regulation. Though WHD would no longer
play an active regulatory role in unpaid academic internship regulation,
Congress should not extinguish WHD’s six-prong test. The six prongs
evolved through decades of case law,153 and it would prove nearly
impossible to ignore this lengthy, albeit conflicting, pedigree. Yet as
currently written, Fact Sheet #71 facilitates neither easy understanding
nor easy application of the precedent to the realities of unpaid academic
internships.
Two minor modifications and one major modification will
incorporate fundamental elements of case law and enable ED to better
regulate unpaid academic internships. First, ED should lead its list of
prongs with the standard it intends to apply to unpaid academic
internships. Second, ED should describe the type of unpaid academic
internship it intends to regulate. Third, ED should describe prohibitions
on unpaid academic internships. And fourth, ED should describe the
mutual understandings employer and intern must share. The following
table summarizes the proposed revisions:

151. What We Do, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/about/what-we-do.html (last
modified Feb. 2, 2010).
152. Id.
153. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of case law analyzing Walling v. Portland
Terminal Co. and Fact Sheet #71.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/9

22

Reid: Fact Sheet #71: Shortchanging the Unpaid Academic Intern

2014]

SHORTCHANGING THE UNPAID ACADEMIC INTERN

1397

CURRENT FACT SHEET #71
PROPOSED REVISIONS
PROVISIONS
1. The internship, even though it 1. The internship experience is for
includes actual operation of the
the benefit of the intern; as
facilities of the employer, is
long as the internship primarily
similar to training which would
benefits
the
intern,
the
be given in an educational
employer may derive some
environment;
advantage from the intern’s
activities;
2. The internship experience is for 2. During the internship, the
the benefit of the intern;
intern receives training and
supervision similar to the
training and supervision that
the intern would receive in a
traditional
educational
environment;
3. The intern does not displace 3. The intern does not displace
regular employees, but works
paid employees; and
under close supervision of
existing staff;
4. The employer that provides the 4. The intern and the employer
training derives no immediate
understand
that,
upon
advantage from the activities of
completion of the internship,
the intern; and on occasion its
the intern is neither entitled to
operations may actually be
wages nor entitled to a job.
impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily
entitled to a job at the
conclusion of the internship;
and
6. The employer and the intern
understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time
spent in the internship.
1. Separating Displacement and Supervision
The first minor modification Congress must make is to rearrange the
content of Fact Sheet #71’s first and third prongs and craft two new
provisions:
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CURRENT FACT SHEET #71
PROPOSED REVISIONS
PROVISIONS
1. The internship, even though it 2. During the internship, the
includes actual operation of the
intern receives training and
facilities of the employer, is
supervision similar to the
similar to training which would
training and supervision that
be given in an educational
the intern would receive in a
environment;
traditional
educational
environment;
3. The intern does not displace 3. The intern does not displace
regular employees, but works
paid employees;
under close supervision of
existing staff;
The above revisions group similar topics, separate dissimilar topics,
and emphasize the significance of each requirement. Though a link
exists between displacement and supervision,154 the two provisions are
not inextricably related. The displacement requirement is primarily
concerned with labor issues, not educational value, whereas supervision
has more in common with academic value than labor issues.
When it stands alone, the displacement requirement emphasizes
WHD’s no-tolerance policy for unpaid internships that infringe upon
existent labor interests. Without the modifying clause regarding
supervision, the third prong can clearly indicate that an internship is
illegal if an unpaid intern displaces a paid worker. The supervision
requirement’s new location in the second prong also promotes clarity
and alleviates employer confusion. Whereas the original six prongs left
employers to wonder whether their workplace environment modeled a
traditional educational environment, the incorporation of the
supervision requirement into the educational environment provision
demonstrates one way in which employers may satisfy this
requirement.155
2. Consolidating Disclosure
Second, Congress should combine Fact Sheet #71’s fifth and sixth
prongs to clarify the test’s disclosure requirements:

154. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31 (using the first criteria to describe supervision and
the third criteria to describe displacement).
155. Id. (“[I]f the employer is providing . . . [internships] under the close and constant
supervision of regular employees, but the intern performs no or minimal work, the activity is
more likely to be viewed as a bona fide education experience.”).
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PROPOSED REVISIONS
CURRENT FACT SHEET #71
PROVISIONS
5. The intern is not necessarily 4. The intern and the employer
entitled to a job at the
understand
that,
upon
conclusion of the internship;
completion of the internship,
and
the intern is neither entitled to
wages nor entitled to a job.
6. The employer and the intern
understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time
spent in the internship.
Though the fifth and sixth prongs both operate to promote full
disclosure between interns and their employers, the words of the current
six-prong test do not accomplish this goal. As currently written, mutual
understanding and disclosure between an intern and an employer are
components in only the sixth prong: “The employer and the intern
understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in
the internship.”156 The fifth prong contains no such disclosure
component. Instead, the fifth prong simply states that “[t]he intern is not
necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship.”157
So while the employer and intern must both understand that the
intern is not entitled to wages, they need not both understand that the
intern should not expect a job at the conclusion of the internship. This
interpretation suggests that as long as an employer knows that an intern
should not expect a job at the internship’s conclusion, a court can find
that the internship satisfies the fifth prong, even if the intern was
unaware that she should not expect a job. Under this interpretation, the
fifth prong does not promote candor and does not adequately protect
students. Congress can solve these problems if it merges the fifth and
sixth prongs and requires full disclosure of both wage rules and job
prospects. With this minor modification, Congress can eliminate both a
senseless discrepancy and a potential inequity in bargaining power.
3. Adopting a Modified Primary Beneficiary Standard
Most unpaid academic internships are illegal because they do not
satisfy Fact Sheet #71’s fourth prong: employers cannot derive any
immediate advantage or benefit from an intern’s “activities.”158 WHD’s
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)
(noting that FLSA allows one to work on the premises of another for her own personal
advantage); Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting
that FLSA does not protect those who work for their own advantage).
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bright-line standard oversimplifies decades of judicial precedent and
presents the best area for major modification.
As evidenced by the disagreement amongst the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits,159 there is no widely accepted legal
standard to determine whether an unpaid internship complies with
FLSA. Few courts demand strict compliance with the six-prong test.160
More typically, courts adopt some iteration of the six-prong test as the
basis for a broader factual inquiry.161 WHD, however, refuses to
consider the more individualized aspects of internships and instead
demands strict compliance with the six-prong test in every instance. To
complicate matters further, WHD’s interpretation of the six-prong test is
riddled with internal conflicts and inconsistencies.
WHD’s use of undefined and vague terms, for example, introduces
interpretive flexibility in the second prong.162 WHD states that “[t]he
internship experience is for the benefit of the intern,”163 but the test fails
to define “benefit.” Fact Sheet #71’s first explanatory paragraph
introduces further ambiguity into the meaning of “benefit.”164 The
second part of the paragraph’s title, “Primary Beneficiary Of The
Activity,” evokes the Solis primary benefit approach, not the test’s
purported bright-line standard.165
The portion of WHD’s explanatory paragraph that prohibits an intern
from “perform[ing] . . . routine work . . . on a regular and recurring
basis” strays even further from the bright-line standard and moves
toward a primary benefit approach.166 The explanatory language
suggests that the employer may benefit from an intern’s work as long as
the employer is not dependent on the intern.167 Yet this suggestion
directly contradicts the test’s fourth prong that states that an employer
cannot derive any benefit.168 It is unclear how to resolve these conflicts
in the current test.
Rather than attempt to resolve the conflicts of an outdated, stringent
standard, Congress should codify the primary benefit legal standard to
incorporate moderation and internal consistency:
159. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of the various standards courts apply to
minimum wage cases.
160. See supra Section I.B.
161. See supra Section I.B.
162. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (capitalization in original); Solis v. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir.
2011).
166. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31; Solis, 642 F.3d at 525.
167. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31.
168. See id. (stating that the employer should “derive[] no immediate advantage” from the
internship).
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CURRENT FACT SHEET #71
PROPOSED REVISIONS
PROVISIONS
2. The internship experience is for 1. The internship experience is for
the benefit of the intern;
the benefit of the intern; as
long as the internship primarily
benefits the intern, the
employer may derive some
advantage from the intern’s
activities;
4. The employer that provides the
training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of
the intern; and on occasion its
operations may actually be
impeded;
The revised standard not only legalizes mutually beneficial unpaid
academic internships but also affords ED and courts discretion to
regulate borderline cases. The primary benefit standard addresses the
realities of unpaid academic internships and maximizes the number of
educationally beneficial opportunities available to students.
CONCLUSION
Academic internships benefit students. They provide opportunities to
discover new careers, network with professionals, and learn different
skills. Yet under Fact Sheet #71’s current guidelines, nearly all unpaid
academic internships fail WHD’s six-prong test.
Fact Sheet #71 fails to effectively regulate unpaid academic
internships because it imposes upon students and employers unrealistic
requirements that undermine opportunities to foster students’
professional growth. The failure of the current test to address economic
and employment realities leads to inconsistent enforcement and
inconsistent judicial interpretation.
Though some employers undoubtedly abuse this source of unpaid
labor, Congress and ED can minimize unfair practices and maximize
educational value if they regulate unpaid academic internships on a
more individualized basis and differentiate between educationally
beneficial unpaid academic internships and educationally deficient
unpaid academic internships. Modifying WHD’s six-prong test,
codifying a new test, and delegating regulatory power to ED all promote
the permanency that students, employers, and courts seek. Unpaid
academic internships play a vital role in the development of the
American workforce. Congress cannot permit conflicts in precedent and

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 9

1402

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

rigid regulations to shortchange students, employers, and the American
economy of a strong, qualified, and competitive workforce.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/9

28

